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 Preface 
Electronic citizen participation has become a realistic 
option on all levels. Electronic participation includes: 
(i) citizen information systems about political decision 
making and law making, such as parlinkom.gv.at; (ii) 
discussion and deliberation platforms; and (iii) direct 
decision making in electronic voting, which is the 
focus of this research project.  
The high level of international experience in the field 
of electronic voting has been encouraging. In a semi-
nal contribution, the Council of Europe published a 
set of minimum requirements for the legal, opera-
tional and technical design of electronic voting sys-
tems [CoE2004]. There is an ever-increasing number 
of pilot projects been conducted in several European 
countries. 
Practical experience is needed, not only to test the 
technology, but also to test the usability and user 
acceptance of such systems. This was the main ob-
jective of this test. 
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all 
those, who made this test possible: 
Our main sponsor, Wiener Zeitung GmbH, the Official 
Journal of the Republic of Austria, and its general 
manager, Mag. Karl Schiessl.  
The IT Department of Wiener Zeitung, which was 
responsible for hosting this test, in particular Mr. 
Josef Berger, Mr. Tilfried Weissenberger and Mr. 
Michael Kick as well as the Marketing Department, in 
particular Ms. Nadja Traxler-Gehrlich for the excellent 
cooperation in preparation and during the test.  
The “election committee” supervising the opening and 
counting of the ballot, Prof. Gabriele Kotsis (President 
of the Austrian Computer Society), Dr. Kurt Breitenstein 
(Vice Dean of the University of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration) and Dr. Andreas Unterberger 
(Editor in chief of Wiener Zeitung).  
Many thanks go to the guest speakers at the sympo-
sium on e-voting held on the 14th of October: 
Dr. Nadja Braun (Swiss Federal Chancellery),  
Dr. Michael Remmert (Council of Europe) and Mr. Nor-
bert Rzesnik (Ministry for Social Affairs, Germany).  
The Report is dedicated to these persons.  
The authors, December 2006 
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 1 The Aims of the Test 
This was the third field test conducted with a proto-
type from the research initiative e-voting.at at the 
University of Economics and Business Administration, 
Vienna (WU). The test had already been conducted in 
2003 (parallel to the Student Union Election, 300 
participants) and 2004 (parallel to the Presidential 
Elections, 1700 participants) [PKK03, WU2004]. 
However, these tests had been conducted among 
students of WU (2003 even only among students of 
business computing), this time, the test addressed 
the general public.  
Particular emphasis was hence placed on the usabil-
ity of the prototype and on the feedback collected in a 
usability lab as well as from a questionnaire that was 
offered to the user after vote casting.  
For each of the tests mentioned, a newly developed 
prototype was used, exploring different technology 
and user options. In this case, the new options ex-
plored were: 
The recovery of the voting card (see Section 2 for 
the process implemented), where the card could be 
recovered by the user in case of loss. This would be a 
considerable improvement as compared to postal 
voting procedures, where lost voting documents may 
not be reproducible. 
Preferential votes or sub-options in the ballot, 
where the voter could first select from a main option 
and depending on his choice a number of sub-options 
further defining the main option were offered for se-
lection (see also copy of the ballot sheet in Fig. 6).  
The ballot is encoded with the public keys of the elec-
tion committee to prevent fraudulent manipulations by 
the election system administration. The procedure is 
that the private keys remain with the respective com-
mittee member until vote casting terminates and the 
ballots are to be opened and counted. In the previous 
tests, the private keys literally stayed with the com-
mittee members, where they could be lost. In this 
test a Key Store was used to generate RSA key 
pairs, whereby the private keys remained in the Key 
Store and could only be retrieved by the committee 
members themselves.   
One of the key requirements for a secure electronic 
voting system is the information separation between 
client and server. Some information must not be known 
to the server. An example is the encryption of the ballot 
before it is sent to the electronic ballot box. Encryption 
prevents the server administration (or whoever has 
access to the election server) from being able to read 
the ballots. However, if the encryption is done on the 
server, it is literally useless, as the server would “see” 
the ballot in its unencrypted form. Therefore, decentral 
logic is needed in the voter’s Web browser in order to 
encrypt the ballot sheet before it is sent to the server 
and it was implemented in this test as a Java applet. 
Java applets require a Java run time environment 
(RTE), which need not necessarily be installed on a 
PC. The user guidance in ascertaining whether a 
Java RTE was already installed on the PC, whether it 
was the right version (or higher) and, if not, to 
download the Java RTE was another focus of this pro-
ject.  
In order to gauge the user’s perception of the voting 
process, a questionnaire was added after vote casting. 
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 2 The Process Used 
The entire voting process is split into two parts: (i) 
voter identification; and (ii) vote casting. This is nec-
essary to maintain anonymity. 
Identification 
The prototype developed at the University of Eco-
nomics and Business Administration Vienna (WU) 
requires user authentication via login (also digital 
signatures had been tested, see [PKK03]), however 
as this test addressed Austrians abroad and since no 
voter register was available (this was an unofficial 
test), authentication was based on self-registration. 
This screen, as was the prototype itself, was imple-
mented as a Java applet. The screen that collected 
names and addresses of the participants (R1, R2 in 
Fig. 1) was added as a separate module and the 
original login screen was disabled. In conformance to 
the Austrian Data Protection Act (DatenschutzG 
2000), user data was deleted after the analysis of the 
test, unless the user, upon registration, had indicated 
his consent for the data to be kept and to receive a 
copy of this report by email.  
The second screen requested the user to enter and 
confirm the password that was used to symmetrically 
encrypt the voting token (R3). A file dialogue box 
prompted the user to specify the file name and loca-
tion of the voting token to be stored locally (R4). The 
voting token was a large random number (due to the 
size of the number, uniqueness could be assumed) 
generated by the applet. In this screen, the user could 
also indicate, whether he wanted to use the recovery 
function for the voting token (see below). 
The token was sent to the election server and the 
verifier to be blindly signed by both1. In this test nei-
ther server checked against a voter register, as the 
test was based on self-registration, hence, any in-
coming request to authenticate a token was accepted 
and performed by the election server and verifier 
(R5a,b). 
The blindly signed tokens were sent back to the client 
and unblinded (R6,7); as a result, the client pos-
sessed two authentic signatures on its random token 
8  e-voting2006.at 
                                                     
1 Blind signatures enable a requestor to obtain an authentic 
signature from a signor without the signor knowing what it 
signed (for details see [Cha82]).  
number. The tokens were formatted in an XML struc-
ture, which was symmetrically encoded with the pass-
word indicated by the user in R3. The resulting file was 
stored locally at the file location selected by the user in 
R4 (R8).  
If the user selected the recovery option, the password-
encoded token was sent to the server to be stored with 
the logged authentication request (R9, R10). If the user 
lost the token, he could have requested the token to be 
resent by email. Since the encoded token was stored, 
neither the election server administration nor anybody 
intercepting the response email in the case of token 
recovery, would be able to open and abuse the token. 
Only the person with the correct password was able to 
use the token. On the downside, not even the system 
administration could help the user recover the token, if 
the password was lost. 
The identification process concluded with the respec-
tive confirmation message, which again reminded the 
voter of the file location selected for the voting token. 
(R12). All steps contained error messages pertaining to 
user as well as system errors. An error was also dis-
played on the client’s PC if communication with the 
server was not possible within a certain time limit.  
Election Committee 
One of the main issues in any e-voting system is the 
system administration’s ability to manipulate votes. An 
appropriate way to prevent such manipulation is to 
decentrally encrypt the ballots (at the voter’s PC) with 
the public keys of the election committee before they 
are sent to the e-voting server. Only after vote casting, 
when the members of the election committee have 
provided their private keys, can the ballots be opened 
and counted.  
In this test, the election committee consisted of three 
members. The process of requesting the election 
committee key for one member is shown in Fig. 2. This 
process must take place before vote casting starts. 
Each committee member sends a digitally signed re-
quest to a Secure Key Store to generate an asymmet-
ric key pair (P1, 2). The traffic between client and Key  
 
 
  
Figure 1: Registration process 
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Figure 2: Public key generation for committee members 
 
 
10  e-voting2006.at 
  
Figure 3: Voting process 
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Figure 4: Opening of the ballot 
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Store is 1024 bit encrypted and authenticated using 
RSA keys2. 
The public keys of the committee members are re-
turned to the election committee server and are later 
delivered to the voter together with the ballot sheet. 
However, the private keys remain in the Secure Key 
Store, inhibiting unauthorized access. They can only 
be retrieved by a digitally signed request of the origi-
nal requestor. It is only with these private keys that 
the ballots can be opened, preventing both the ad-
ministration and/or a single member of the election 
committee from gaining access. This safeguard en-
sures that only authorized members of the election 
committee may jointly open the ballots.  
The issue of the request in the election committee 
system and its reception in the Key Store as well as 
the respective response are logged in a tamper-proof 
encoded log file.  
Voting 
The voter was guided though the authentication and 
voting process with a second Java client applet. The 
voter was first required to enter the password used to 
encrypt the voting token and to specify the location of 
the file containing the token (V1,2). The token was 
then decoded with the voter’s personal password and 
it was attempted to parse the XML structure (V3), the 
attempt failed, if the user indicated an invalid or cor-
rupted token or an invalid password. In this case, the 
user was prompted again for the password and token 
file.  
If the XML structure of the token was parsed success-
fully, the signed tokens (election authority and veri-
fier) were sent to the ballot box to be verified (V4,5). If 
only one of the signatures could not be verified, the 
request was rejected (V7,8), otherwise the ballot 
sheet was returned together with the keys of the elec-
tion committee members (V6). The voter filled in the 
ballot sheet and before the ballot was cast, it was 
consecutively encoded with the keys of the election 
committee members. The encoded ballot sheet, inex-
tricable linked to the token was then sent back to the 
ballot box server (V9-11).  
The ballot box proceeded once again to verify the 
authenticity of the token and the link between token 
2 For an introduction, see [Sch01].  
and encoded ballot (V10). The ballot box then either 
stored the encoded vote or rejected it (V13-15). 
Opening and counting of the ballot 
After vote casting had finished, the members of the 
election committee provided their respective private 
keys by issuing a request to the Key Store to reproduce 
and provide the private keys that correspond to the 
public keys, which had been used to encrypt the votes 
(C1).  
The request was once again encrypted and verified 
with 1024 bit RSA keys. After verifying the requestor, 
the Key Store reproduced and delivered the private key 
for the respective committee members (C2-4). The 
upper part of the process depicted in Fig. 4 shows the 
procedure for one individual committee member.  
The election committee function receives the keys and 
stores them for future use (C5,6). Once all private keys 
have been provided, the ballot can be opened and 
counted (C7-9). 
 
 3 Security Analysis of the Process 
In 2004, the Council of Europe published a set of 
minimum legal, operational and technical require-
ments for voting systems [CoE2004]. Its Appendix III 
lists the possible threats to which a voting system 
exposed. Below, the voting process is discussed 
according to the criteria set (headings below) by the 
Council of Europe.  
T.Audit_Forgery and T.Observ_Forgery 
This concerns the forgery of audit data collected. All 
log files used are RSA encoded with the private key 
stored externally and physically separated from the 
operational system.  
T.Auth_Disclosure 
This concerns the disclosure of login and authentica-
tion data enabling impersonation of the respective 
person:  
1. Voter authentication in identification: N/A because 
the process was based on self-registration.  
2. Voter authentication in vote casting: The voter is 
authenticated according to a voting token, which only 
the voter himself may open. As long as the voter 
keeps the password secret, nobody is able to use 
said token.  
3. Login to the election committee software and Se-
cure Key Store: Logins are stored as standard SHA-1 
password hashes and Web service requests are 
RSA-authenticated.  
T.Hack 
This requirement is sometimes misinterpreted as 
primarily concerning conventional server security. 
This however, is a fundamental misconception be-
cause: (i) servers may always be vulnerable, hence a 
voting system whose security is solely based upon 
server security may be questioned in general, (ii) the 
most dangerous attacker of all, the system adminis-
trator of the election system, always has access to 
the servers and hence, the necessary implementation 
of additional safeguards such as ensuring that: (A) 
even the system administrator may not match the 
vote with a voter (see T.Vote_Confidentiality); (B) 
even the system administrator may not abuse a vot-
ing token (even when stored in the recovery function) 
to impersonate an eligible voter and to steal his vote 
(see T.Vote_Impers); (C) even the system administra-
tor cannot modify votes cast (see T.Vote_Modify); 
and (D) even the system administrator cannot insert 
forged votes (see T.Vote_Impers).  
T.System_Forgery 
This concerns redirecting a Web page to a fake web-
site in an effort to mislead the voter into believing that 
he had indeed voted. The standard measures are to 
digitally sign the applets used. However, since this was 
an academic test and considering the costs incurred for 
such a signature, self-signed certificates were used for 
the Java applets. The main site, however, had a valid 
https certificate.  
T.CandList_Disclosure and T.CandList_Modify 
Since the list of candidates (that is options to choose 
from) were hard-coded in the prototype used, all issues 
concerned with lists stored in a database, therefore did 
not apply. In most referenda and elections in Austria, 
candidate (or options) disclosure is not an issue, as the 
available choices are published well before the vote. 
Also in this test, the list of options were known before-
hand (not least because screen cam shows were made 
available to users beforehand). List modification, how-
ever, becomes an issue as soon as variable candidate 
lists are sent from an election server and rendered by 
the client. In this case, protection needs to be provided 
in order to prevent tampering with the ballot sheet, 
communicated to the client. 
T.Malfunction_XXX 
This threat is defined for several stages in the election 
(hence summarized here as “XXX”) and it concerns the 
deletion of data used. This is primarily an operational 
issue and in this test, all servers concerned were mir-
rored (see Section 4) and therefore the deletion of data 
would have been detected.  
T.XXX_DOS 
This concerns threats through Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks and also applies to all stages of the election. 
The effective protection from DoS attacks is primarily 
an infrastructure question and does not concern the 
process design as such. 
T.XXX_Time 
Many processes in an election are time-specific. An 
example may be a voter trying to cast a vote just before 
14  e-voting2006.at 
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the closure of the ballot box. Options to fulfill this 
requirement include linking the servers to an external 
time service (the option selected in this case) or the 
usage of an external timestamp service.  
T.Privacy and T.Voter_Privacy 
This concerns the disclosure of voter’s and/or candi-
date’s private data. E-voting2006.at did not store any 
candidate data and due to the self-registration proc-
ess the only data stored was that indicated by the 
voters themselves.  
T.VoteReg_Disclosure and T.VoteReg_Modify 
This concerns disclosure of data from the voter regis-
ter and did not apply, as no register was used and the 
respective parts of the prototype had been disabled in 
the deployment. 
T.Ballot_Forgery 
This concerns the fraudulent modification of the ballot 
sheet displayed, see also T.CandList_Modify.  
T.CommD_Avail_pre 
This concerns the availability and integrity of the data 
from the pre-voting stage. As the Recommendation 
mentions, this data is not required if voting is based 
on an anonymous voting token, which is the case in 
this system. 
T.CommDSec_pre 
This concerns the confidentiality of the voters’ regis-
ter. Again, as specified in the Recommendation, this 
requirement does not apply to situations (rather it is 
“automatically” fulfilled), where the right to vote is 
vested in an anonymous voting token.  
T.Vote_Confidentiality and T.Vote_Trail 
This concerns the ability of an attacker to match the 
voter with the voter’s actual vote. Several lines of 
attack which have to be considered are: 
1. When the verifier or the election authority sign a 
token request, they know, which voter issued the 
request. However, the blind signature prevents them 
from tracing the token itself back to the voter. The 
processing of the token itself (generation and blinding 
R4, unblinding in R7, creating the XML structure and 
encoding the token after the signatures, R6-R8) was 
done decentrally without the server having access to 
the data processed.  
2. When the token is used to obtain a ballot and to cast 
a vote, it does not contain any data that could be used 
to trace it back to the voter.  
3. The tracing of the IP address in the registration and 
vote casting process in order to map the voter and to 
the corresponding vote. Due to the clear technical 
separation of these two phases, this mapping is not 
possible. The registration server may log IP addresses 
of registrants but does not “see” the voting token is-
sued. The same applies to the ballot box, which may 
also log IP addresses, but does not know (i) who is 
“behind” the voting token and (ii) the ballot is stored in 
the ballot box encrypted and only the committee mem-
bers can open it.; in addition, the opened ballots are 
not stored persistently and every recount requires to go 
back to the original encoded ballots.  
4. Intercept the ballot sheet when it is sent to the ballot 
box. Since the ballot is decentrally encrypted at the 
voter’s PC, this attack will yield no result. 
T.Vote_Modify 
This concerns the ability to intercept a vote and to 
meaningfully change it. Since the vote is encoded with 
the keys of the committee members neither the system 
administrator nor a third party may meaningfully 
change votes. The only option left to an attacker gain-
ing access to the voting data by whatever means is to 
aimlessly delete votes, which would, however, be at 
least noticed by comparing the tamper-proof encoded 
log files to the votes in the database after the election.  
T.Vote_Multiple 
This concerns protection from voters casting multiple 
votes either via e-voting or via multiple channels. Multi-
ple e-votes are prevented by the check in Step V12a. 
Multiple voting channels were not used in this test.  
T.Vote_Impers 
This concerns impersonating an eligible voter to cast a 
vote (and to effectively steal the vote). The following 
possibilities exist in the process: 
1. A system administrator of the election authority or 
the verifier or a third party intercept the token signature 
request. However, since the blinding parameters are 
only known to the client, the attacker could not extract 
the net token without the blinding layer (see [Cha82]). 
2. Stealing the voting token either from the voters file or 
backup system, an attack during data communication 
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or (as a system administrator) from the token recov-
ery database. This, of course, may occur at any time, 
but the attacker would not be able to decode the vot-
ing token as this requires the personal password only 
known to the legitimate voter.  
T.CommD_Avail_elec 
This concerns availability and integrity of data from 
the voting stage. It requires standard infrastructure 
measures and as far as attacks on the data are con-
cerned, the argument follows T.Vote_Multiple.  
T.CommD_Sec_elec 
This concerns the confidentiality of data from the 
voting stage. Nobody can read the votes until the 
committee members provided their private keys. Even 
when the ballots are opened to be counted, the sys-
tem does not store the decoded votes in the data-
base. Every recount is done with the original encoded 
ballots.  
T.MisCount and T.Result_Modify, 
T.Report_Modify 
This concerns protection from incorrect counting. The 
appropriate protection would be to store votes in two 
independent electronic ballot boxes and to initiate an 
independent count to see, whether results tally. The 
prototype being used for this test did not accommo-
date for this option. However, its implementation on 
top of the existing process is rather straightforward. 
Another option would be to manipulate the coding 
used (which is a general issue). In its simplest form it 
would consist of the insertion of a statement that, with 
x% likelihood, deletes votes for a certain party or 
referendum option. In its general form this could be 
considered as threat T.ElectionSoftware_Modify. This 
threat can only be countered by software certification 
that involves the source code as well (i.e. Common 
Criteria using an EAL level or augmentation that in-
volves direct source code inspection, see [CC06]) 
combined with digitally signed code used in deploy-
ment. In this case, all parties concerned can be as-
sured that the software being used is actually the 
software inspected by the certification authority. Con-
sidering the costs of such a certification inspection, it 
is obvious that such measures were not undertaken 
for this test. 
T.Partial_Count and T.Premature_Count 
This concerns an attack, whereby partial results are 
computed from the votes cast in order to track voters or 
to illicitly obtain early voting results. This was prevented 
by the fact that the encoded votes could only be jointly 
opened by the election committee.  
T.Vote_Duplicates 
This concerns the insertion of duplicate votes either 
due to an attacker (in this case it would be a subset of 
T.Vote-Multiple, see above) or due to malfunction. The 
latter was prevented by storing the voting token to-
gether with the vote cast as well as the data inextrica-
bly linking them together. Since a unique index was 
used for the database field storing the token, no token 
could have been entered twice.  
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Figure 5: Implementation (for trademark information see References) 
 
Productive Environment 
Figure 5 shows the implementation overview. The 
following logical building blocks can be distin-
guished: 
A. Self registration for the test (R1 and R2 in Fig. 1).  
B. The electoral roll function, where users obtain a 
voting token (all remaining steps in Fig. 1 except for 
Step R5b); the prototype as such uses login-based 
authentication, which was deactivated as there was 
no electoral roll in this unofficial test. In fact, every-
body who passed the self-registration in Building 
Block A was forwarded as authenticated to the elec-
tion system itself.  
C. The verifier (Step R5b). 
D. The ballot box (all steps in Fig. 3). 
E. The election committee function (all steps in Figs. 
2 and 4 except for P2, 3, 4a,b and C2-4).  
F. The Key Store (the steps excepted in E).  
They can be assigned to the physical building blocks 
as follows: 
A to D in the Web application server was duplicated 
in a load balancing configuration and used the (also 
duplicated) database server. The hardware used 
was standard single-processor Fujitsu-Siemens 
Primergy servers with 2 GB RAM. 
E was implemented on the Election Committee 
server in Fig. 5, for which a Primergy double proces-
sor system with 2 GB RAM was used.  
F was implemented on the Secure Key Store server 
in Fig. 5, which was the only server not hosted by 
Wiener Zeitung, but was made accessible via a Web 
service by the software vendor. The hardware used 
was a Dell single processor Dual Core server with 1 
GB RAM.  
A – C were based on a prototype developed at WU 
in 2005 in a research project for implementing and 
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verifying the cryptographic parts of the processes 
depicted in Figs. 1 and 3. As can be seen in Fig. 5, it 
is based on Java 1.4 and Apache Tomcat. 
F is a commercial standard system implemented as 
a Microsoft IIS Web Service and E was specifically 
developed for this project using the Microsoft .net 
framework and SQL Server.  
At the beginning of the project, major concerns ex-
isted in regards to whether the cryptographic imple-
mentations, particularly that of RSA and AES, would 
work smoothly together. The Java prototype stores 
cryptographic keys in plain hexadecimal format, 
whereas Microsoft .net uses its XML-based Crypto 
Service Provider format, which has a completely 
different numerical representation of the keys. In 
addition, to use the BigInteger classes that were 
used in the Java prototype for the cryptographic 
computations3, Microsoft’s BigInteger implementa-
tion (part of its Java implementation) had to be used, 
where possible performance implications had to be 
considered.  
As it turned out, neither of these points was an issue 
and even though this was not part of the intended 
project scope, through this project it can be seen that 
Java-based cryptography and .net applications are 
able to work smoothly together and with good per-
formance.  
Development Environment 
The development environment for the prototype was 
Netbeans 4 with its bundled Tomcat Web Server and 
Windows XP SP2. The primary test environment 
before deployment was Windows 2003 Server SP1, 
Apache Tomcat and Java RTE 1.4.2, hence, the 
same environment as the productive system.  
Test Environment E-Voting Prototype 
The system was developed and functionally tested 
under Java 1.4.2 and Internet Explorer. However, 
also the current versions of Firefox and Mozilla were 
tested. Only the Opera Browser experienced major 
issues in rendering the Java interface. The issues 
could not be resolved completely and hence Opera 
was not added to the list of supported Browsers.  
3 Needed for all non-standard cryptographic functions, such as 
blind signatures and some hash functions.  
In spite of complete downward compatibility accord-
ing to documentation, the ballot sheet was not ren-
dered correctly under Java 1.5 and some modifica-
tions had to be made to the coding in order to render 
it correctly for this test.  
We were not sure, how many voters to expect, 
hence, a stress test was conducted. Robots were 
constructed and installed implementing repetitive 
loops interacting with the test server. Apart from 
several smaller elections two major elections with 
10000 and 30000 participants, respectively, were 
simulated. The system environment for the “robot” 
PCs was Windows XP SP2 and Windows 2000 SP4. 
Test Environment Key Store and Election Com-
mittee Server 
The Key Server used was a standard product that 
can be installed on Windows XP2 IIS 5.1 as well as 
Windows 2003 Server IIS 6. Due to the small num-
ber of interactions in the test, it was decided to use 
an XP server. The Web Service implementing the 
Key Store was not available locally at the premises 
of Wiener Zeitung but was accessed remotely at the 
vendor’s premises.  
The most critical function of the election committee 
function was to open and count the ballot once the 
election committee members provided their private 
keys. For each vote, three RSA keys had to be 
opened, with the key length being 512, 784 and 
1024 bit, resp. 
Two stress tests were conducted:  
A test with 10000 votes, where opening took 22 
minutes (0.132 seconds per vote); 
A test with 30000 votes, where opening took 1 hour 
and 7 minutes (0.134 seconds per vote).  
This would indicate that opening time increments 
linearly; operating parameters during opening were 
observed, at no stage, RAM became an issue and 
RAM usage remained well below the space physi-
cally available (2 GB).  
 
 
 5 Usability Test 
This section provides the results of a usability test 
conducted with 16 test persons.  
The target group for the usability test were standard 
users with basic Internet knowledge, especially peo-
ple who are not very experienced with computers. 16 
persons with basic or moderate computer skills were 
randomly chosen. As Table 1 shows, disproportional 
emphasis was put on members of the higher age 
groups. There was an almost even distribution 
among men and women.  
The purpose of the tests was to yield information on 
how to improve the website as well as the e-voting 
software. The main focus was to make it as easy 
and as simple as possible. The tests were conducted 
at an early stage of the project and several modifica-
tions were made to the software as a result of the 
observations. 
Setup 
The tests were conducted under Windows XP, 10 
test persons used Internet Explorer, 6 persons the 
Firefox browser.  
Before the test started the subject was given a short 
explanation about e-voting and where he or she can 
find the web site4. There was no interaction between 
observer and test person during the test, the ob-
server limited himself to recording the interactions of 
the test person. All steps and problems were noted 
on a checklist.  
1. The usage of the website and the help content for 
the registration process. 
2. The registration process 
3. The help content for the voting process 
4. The voting process 
Particular emphasis was put on providing adequate 
help and background information on the test; the 
Web page is still available at www.e-voting2006.at. It 
consisted of help information for registration and 
vote casting including screen cam shows for both 
steps and technical background information relating 
the steps in the user interface to the technical proc-
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4 For easy readability, the text generally uses the male form. 
ess. Table 2 however shows that the users took 
hardly any notice of the help information.  
The obvious solution is to integrate help information 
“just-in-time” when it is needed in the process, how-
ever, this may conflict with the aim of minimizing the 
user interface and user interaction when the person 
votes.  
Registration 
Another problem was, that 3 test persons mistook 
the screenshots in the original help page with the 
real software and tried to enter data in the first 
screenshot (the self registration screen). This was 
solved in the revised version by clearly labelling the 
screenshots as such.  
8 out of 16 test persons experienced difficulties in 
finding the link to the Web page in order to start the 
e-voting software. As a result, the starting link was 
disproportionately emphasised in the revised ver-
sion.  
A Java applet has very limited access privileges to 
local resources, unless it is digitally signed by the 
issuer. For budgetary reasons and since this was 
only a test, a self-signed applet was used instead of 
a digital signature that could be traced back to a root 
certificate by the respective browser. In the case of a 
self-signed applet, a security warning pop-up screen 
appears asking the user, whether he or she wants to 
reject, accept or always accept the signature from 
that issuer. 4 users who rejected the signature had 
to restart the applet, from the referring page, which 
worked in all cases.  
The address screen for self registration was under-
stood by all test persons (Step R1 in Figure 1).  
The next screen was to enter and confirm the pass-
word for the encoding of the voting card and to indi-
cate whether the recovery option (see Section 2) 
was selected. 2 users had problems with the mini-
mum password length (8 characters) required. In 
response to this issue, additional information was 
included on the password entry screen (Step R2 in 
Figure 1) in the revised version. The same applied to 
the recovery function, which was not understood by 
4 test persons.  
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The file dialogue in the registration process (R4) was 
understood by all test persons. 
A main issue seems to have been the long response 
time for the token generation (typically 5 to 8 sec-
onds depending on server load and local processing 
power of the user’s PC). Most test persons started to 
impatiently click on the screen, hence a waiting 
message was included in the revised version used. 
In order to have a more realistic setting, a break was 
made after registration.  
Voting 
4 Persons had issues with entering/remembering the 
password in Step V1. To facilitate user handling, 
failure to correctly parse the voting token in V3 re-
sulted in positioning the user once again in the 
password entry screen in V1 (see Fig. 3).  
It was generally expected that finding the voting 
token in the file system in Step V2 would be a major 
issue for most inexperienced users. The problem 
seemed particularly stringent, as helpdesk staff can  
only help the voter in finding the token, if the voter 
remembers its name. However, only one test person 
had problems finding the voting token. Also during 
the test itself, this was not an issue. The fact that 
users didn’t have any problems in finding their voting 
cards is probably one of the most interesting results 
of this test. It shows that also inexperienced com-
puter users can handle voting token files and use 
them appropriately to cast a vote. 
4 test persons experienced issues with the ballot 
sheet: Some test users tried to enter several choices 
in the screen form, which was, of course, prevented 
by the screen control. The ballot sheets used in the 
non-binding tests in 2003 and 2004 were rather 
straightforward: In 2003 it listed the parties for the 
student elections at WU and in 2004 the names of 
the two candidates for the Presidential Election. This 
time, the ballot sheets suggested some improve-
ments for casting votes from abroad (see Fig. 6). For 
each main option, except for “Keine davon” (none of 
these), which corresponds to a blank vote, some 
sub-options were also available. Of course, the sub-
option chosen had to correspond to the selected 
main option. The user was therefore requested to 
pass through a two-stage selection process. 4 test 
persons had problems understanding this mecha-
nism and tried to select sub-options for a main option 
that had not been selected or to select more than 
one option. 
 
 
  
Age % 
15-19 0% 
20-29 19% 
30-39 6% 
40-49 13% 
50-59 56% 
>60 6% 
 
Education % 
Compulsory school 13%
Apprenticeship 38%
Vocational school 0%
Secondary school 31%
University 19%
 
Gender % 
Women 56%
Men 44%
 
Table 1: Demographic factors in sample 
Help page % Pers.  Technical explanation  % Pers.
Read helppages 0% 0  Read technical explanation 6% 1
Short look 63% 10  Short look 31% 5
Did not use help page 38% 6  Did not read 63% 10
 
Table 2: Usage of help information 
 
Figure 6: Ballot sheet 
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 6 The Test 
Time Frame and Helpdesk Requests 
The registration phase took place between 25th Sep-
tember 0:00 am and 11th October 12:00 pm. Vote 
casting took place between 12th October 0:00 am 
and 24th October 5:00 pm. Email support was avail-
able during registration and a helpdesk person for 
telephone support from 9 am to 6 pm CET during 
vote casting. 293 persons registered and 148 per-
sons actually cast a vote. Austrians abroad were the 
main target group and obviously it had been difficult 
to approach this group in the given time frame. Nev-
ertheless valuable insights were gained from the 
feedback of users that, unlike WU students in previ-
ous tests, were not completely familiar with the use 
of computers.  
All told, Helpdesk logged 19 requests: 
2 users forgot their passwords: In this case Helpdesk 
could not help in any way, as it is the very intention 
of the mechanism to stop anybody other than the 
voter himself to gain access to the voting token. In 2 
other cases, it could not be decided whether the 
token file had been damaged or the voter had forgot-
ten the password.  
4 persons tried to view the token by double clicking 
on it, which, of course, did not work, as there is no 
application linked to it. In fact, the token is a simple 
text file containing the result of the symmetric en-
cryption process in text form. It can be viewed with 
any text editor, such as Windows Notepad. The 
wording used for the voting token was “elektronische 
Wahlkarte” (electronic voting card), which may have 
led users to believe that, if opened, it would display 
some sort of text or an emulation of a paper-based 
voting card. In fact, the voting card was a signed 
bitstring that only fulfilled the function of a voting 
card. This obviously has to be better communicated 
to the end user.  
One user experienced problems with Java 1.4.1. The 
applet required 1.4.2, which was probably not com-
municated clearly enough in the help information. 
The user was guided by the Helpdesk to download 
the current Java version 1.5 and was able to pro-
ceed.  
Nobody else lodged a request that would indicate 
that Java had not been installed on the participant’s 
PC. One may only hypothise about the reasons, one 
reason may be that in many cases pre-configured 
PCs sold via consumer channels actually do have a 
current Java version installed and users are not 
required to install Java themselves. Users who build 
the software environment on their PC themselves, 
on the other hand, would have been able to follow 
the instructions on the help pages to download and 
install the free Java run time environment.  
One user was confused that a self-signed applet was 
used, a procedure which was chosen for cost rea-
sons (see above). In a real election, any such sys-
tem would obviously use a valid signature that can 
be traced back to a root-certificate. 
After the vote had been cast, the user was re-routed 
to a questionnaire (see below), one person did not 
receive the questionnaire and logged a Helpdesk 
request.  
The remaining Helpdesk requests were suggestions 
for improvement, most concerning the use of a 
signed applet.  
An Unsollicited Attack on the System 
The prototype developed at WU was used in this test 
with two add-ons: (i) The self registration and (ii) the 
questionnaire (see below). 
Due to an oversight by the programming team at 
WU, there was an issue in the deployment of the 
self-registration add-on to the prototype. Some parts 
of the server functionality of the self-registration were 
in fact configured to be delivered to the voter to-
gether with the applet. In an unsolicited attack on the 
system, Mr Leitold from a-sit (www.a-sit.at) attacked 
the prototype system and due to the aforementioned 
issue was able to compromise the add-on. The at-
tack as such was immediately noticed by Wiener 
Zeitung IT staff, which triggered a security check of 
its infrastructure. The deployment issue in the con-
figuration of the add-on, however, remained unno-
ticed. Unfortunately, Mr. Leitold did not disclose his 
findings to the project team, otherwise the self-
registration add-on could have been easily rede-
ployed. 
However, as was established later beyond doubt he 
was not able to successfully penetrate or compro-
mise the election as such. The processes employed 
did not enable anybody to forge or modify votes or to 
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break voter anonymity and no such claims were 
actually made. This attack proves that the processes 
implemented in order to maintain voter security and 
anonymity work even when one is able to directly 
access information stored in the database itself. It 
should be once again mentioned that this system is 
designed not just to secure an election protecting it 
from hackers but also from the system administra-
tion, who may wish to manipulate the election. The 
System Administration has complete access to the 
database storing the voter information, hence the 
necessity for highly developed encryption and de-
cryption processes to protect the integrity of the 
election.  
As mentioned, the primary focus of the test was on 
usability and the acceptance of a two-stage voting 
process, a security test was not conducted and not 
within the project scope. Nevertheless this unsolic-
ited attack showed that the processes employed 
provide a strong protection from fraudulent attacks 
designed to compromise an election. These techni-
cal aspects are to be explored in more details in 
separate publications. To follow the publications 
issued by the project team, please consult www.e-
voting.at.  
Result of the Ballot 
Table 3 depicts the result of the ballot. Not very sur-
prisingly, electronic voting was the modification to 
the election processes of choice for the participants 
in the e-voting test. Of course, the result has a 
strong bias, however, some conclusions may be 
drawn nevertheless: 
“Stationary” e-voting via terminals is not particularly 
popular even among those who do favour e-voting in 
general. This corroborates the results of a Working 
Group on e-voting in the Ministry of the Interior 
[BMI05], which did not recommend terminal-based e-
voting in polling stations.  
Interestingly, the idea of advance voting for residents 
in Austria, who are not in the country when the elec-
tions takes place, seems to have some support, 
where even the possibility of advance voting in se-
lected polling stations is the preference of choice for 
the majority of those in favour of advance voting.  
 
Option/sub-option Number Percent 
Postal voting in Austria 
    No sub-option chosen 
    Upon request 
    Automatic sending of postal 
     voting documents 
6 
 
0 
4 
2 
4% 
Postal voting abroad without 
Austrian witness  
    No sub-option chosen 
    Any EU citizen as witness 
    No witness 
12 
 
0 
6 
6 
8,1% 
Electronic voting 
    No sub-option chosen 
    In Austrian embassy 
       /consulate 
    Via the Internet 
118 
2 
2 
 
114 
79,7% 
Advance voting 
    No sub-option chosen 
    Per postal voting 
    In selected polling stations 
8 
1 
2 
5 
5,4% 
None of the aforementioned 4 2,7% 
Table 3: Result of the ballot 
Recovery Function 
For the first time, a recovery function for the voting 
token was offered (see Section 2). By default, the 
option was de-selected and one of the prime ques-
tions of this test was, whether the recovery function 
would be understood, trusted and actively used.  
153 out of 297 participants selected the recovery, 
which is 51,5%. This shows that the recovery func-
tion meets a real need and is accepted by the users 
of an e-voting system. Interestingly, none of the 
users during the test seem to have had any difficul-
ties understanding and using the recovery function, 
as there were no requests in this regard. 
Two persons actually used the recovery function, in 
that the encoded voting token was sent to their 
specified email addresses. Also in two cases, where 
it was not clear, whether the password had been 
forgotten or the token file was corrupted, the token 
 was resent (both had used the recovery option). In a 
paper-based mail voting process, the vote would 
have lost his possibility to vote. The recovery func-
tion in electronic voting enables the voter to securely 
store and, if need be, request the voting token.  
Results of Questionnaire 
After they had cast their vote, participants were re-
routed to a one-page questionnaire about their user 
experience. Table 4 shows the questions (translated 
into English) and the results. In 4 questions, users 
could indicate their support for a statement on the 
usual 5 point Likert scale (1 indicating strong sup-
port), the last one was a yes/no question.  
85% of the respondents indicated strong or very 
strong support that the registration was easy to use; 
the corresponding value was 83% for vote casting. 
This confirmed the result of the usability test, where 
the majority of the test persons could work through 
the dialogues without a problem. Also, it reflects the 
modifications made in response to usability difficul-
ties encountered in the tests. Only 6% of the re-
spondents (strongly) disagreed that the prototype 
was easy to use. This seems to be remarkable for an 
application, participants cannot have encountered 
before, and hence would not have learnt its mecha-
nisms in similar applications.  
In the literature it is increasingly recognized that 
using an anonymised voting token is the prime way 
to technically guarantee voter anonymity (see Sec-
tion 3). However, this guarantee comes at a price: 
Two interactions are necessary for the user to cast a 
vote (two-stage process). The question is, whether 
this would be accepted.  
In a remarkable result, 90% of the respondents 
(strongly) supported the idea of a two-stage voting 
process. This may also reflect the fact that voters 
have already “learnt” the two-stage postal voting 
process with application and voting itself. That was 
also the prime reason for the wording “electronic 
voting card” for the token.  
68% of the respondents expressed (strong) support 
in the system and its ability to correctly conduct the 
election and to protect voter anonymity. 19% were 
neutral and 12% obviously did not trust the system. 
The only way to counter these concerns is transpar-
ency about how the systems works and the ability of 
the election committee/s to check the system at all 
times and in all stages of an election 
Finally, participants were asked whether they had 
used the help pages provided with the prototype. 
The result corroborated the observations of the us-
ability lab in that the majority did not (even briefly) 
consult the help information. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Result of questionnaire 
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 7 Lessons Learnt 
Functionality 
The recovery function was used and widely ac-
cepted and obviously meets a clear need. 
The elaborate help page provided was generally not 
used (which should not lead one to the conclusion 
that it would be unnecessary, however it cannot be a 
panacea). Rather, help information has to be in-
cluded in the voting process to be provided to the 
user “just in time”. This however conflicts with a par-
simonious interface to minimize various risks, from 
undue influence on the voter’s decision, via compati-
bility issues, pop-up blocking to various technical 
vulnerabilities. To reconcile these two aims will be a 
major challenge.  
A two-stage voting process is acceptable to users, 
if the reasons are explained. If it is necessary to 
preserve voter anonymity, users tend to accept the 
additional effort.  
The mechanics of the voting token as experienced 
by the users has to be more transparent to the user, 
which was clearly shown by the attempts to extract 
some sort of textual information from the token.  
Usability 
The vast majority found the existing prototype easy 
to use; this in spite of the multiple stages to be per-
formed: register (authenticate yourself in a real sys-
tem), specify password and file name (registration) 
and password entry, file specification and filling in 
the ballot sheet (voting stage). Hence, the main prin-
cipals of user guidance and of the logic employed in 
this test can be used as a foundation for further 
work.  
In regards to the sub- or preferential options, 
some test persons in the usability lab experienced 
difficulties in handling the options. However, it is 
interesting to note that most votes actually cast in 
the test contained a sub-option (whose indication 
was optional). Therefore one is lead to conclude that 
the preferential mechanism was understood in the 
end. Nevertheless, user guidance by the system to 
prevent invalid votes is clearly indicated.  
Two issues that were expected by the project team 
did not manifest: 
Also inexperienced users seem to be able to handle 
token files (“voting card”), to find them again and 
associate the correct password with it.  
The Java download and Java version triggered a 
single helpdesk request. This would indicate that (i) 
in spite of the issues with Java and the Windows 
platform, a Java runtime environment is a reality also 
on Windows PCs and (ii) that users can be com-
fortably and securely guided to download the run 
time environment if needed.  
Transparency 
Results of the questionnaire indicate that an elec-
tronic voting system will only be universally trusted if 
all processes are completely transparent. System 
certification and software signing by independent 
authorities will play a major role in this context.  
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